| Tackling Proliferation, Multilaterally (PDF)
In North Korea and Iran, Security Council action has placed proliferators on the defensive. The time is right to beef up international non-proliferation regimes.
In June 2004, the 9-11 Commission concluded that "the greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the world's most dangerous terrorists acquire the world's most dangerous weapons." Six months later, the sweeping Report of the Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change arrived at a similar conclusion: "Any use of nuclear weapons, by accident or design, risks human casualties and economic dislocation on a catastrophic scale. Stopping the proliferation of such weapons—and their potential use by state or non-state actors—must remain an urgent priority for collective security."
The two reports, though different in scope and purpose, state plainly what security experts have cautioned for years: a nuclear device in the hands of a fanatic murderer is one of the most pressing threats in the world today. But while we are all aware of the nature of this threat, international policies to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction remain dangerously inadequate. Despite the warnings, governments around the world are still reluctant to commit themselves to arms control and non-proliferation structures.
However, a growing body of evidence suggests that multilateral strategies to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction are the most effective foil to potential proliferators. In recent months, pressure at the Security Council has prodded Iran and North Korea to re-evaluate the costs of continuing their nuclear programs. Inside Iran and North Korea, there are signs that punitive Security Council sanctions are beginning to show their intended political effects. Shortly after the Council imposed sanctions on North Korea last fall, Pyongyang returned to the six-party talks. In February, these talks yielded their first significant breakthrough in years. And, although the rhetoric of Iranian leadership has continued to be unyielding, it appears that internal fissures are beginning to form in Iran’s resistance to international efforts to curb its nuclear program.
Building on these accomplishments, the United States, in concert with key member states should adopt new strategies that encompass and encourage international cooperation. As described in detail below, there have been significant breakthroughs in ad hoc Security Council efforts to combat proliferation. Member states must now throw their support behind efforts to strengthen permanent and institutionalized arms control and non-proliferation mechanisms.
Progress on North Korea
For much of the 1990s the so-called "Agreed Framework" provided an outline for the dismantlement of North Korean nuclear facilities. Under the terms of the Agreed Framework, North Korea would shutdown its plutonium nuclear facility in Yongbyon and place spent plutonium (which can be used in nuclear weapons) under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) control. In return, the United States would help North Korea construct two light water reactors and provide fuel-oil shipments to the North during the reactors' construction. The agreement also provided steps for a normalization of political and economic relations between the two countries, which had been formally at war since the 1950s.
In October 2002, the United States accused North Korea of violating the Agreed Framework by pursuing a secret uranium enrichment program for the manufacture of a nuclear arsenal. Relations between the two countries soon deteriorated. In December, North Korean kicked out IAEA inspectors who were monitoring the plutonium stockpiles in Yongbyon. The next month, the North formally withdrew from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), effectively killing the Agreed Framework. The United States, in response, imposed unilateral economic sanctions on the North, including an asset freeze on some of North Korea's holdings abroad.
In the face of a stand-off between North Korea and the United States, the six-party talks began in earnest in spring 2004. The United States, with Russia, South Korea, Japan, and China, met North Korean delegations searching for ways to de-escalate the conflict and bring North Korea back into compliance with the NPT. But after five rounds of talks over three years, setbacks clearly outpaced gains. In September 2004, North Korea declared that it had produced a nuclear weapon. By November 2005, the six party talks were stalled indefinitely.
Then, on October 9, 2006, North Korea tested a plutonium grade nuclear weapon. The Security Council's condemnation was swift. On October 14, the Council unanimously passed Resolution 1718, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The Resolution demanded North Korea halt its nuclear development and return to six party talks without precondition. It also called for punitive sanctions against North Korean interests; per the resolution, there would be targeted sanctions and a travel ban on individuals connected to the nuclear program, a ban on the import and export of heavy weaponry and armaments, a ban on the export of luxury goods, and inspections of cargo ships heading to and from North Korea.
Some critics considered the sanctions package too "light." Though the resolution was placed under chapter VII, it eschewed authorizing military force to back up the demands. Further, the inspections of ships heading to and from North Korea would be voluntary—no country was obliged to actually inspect the ships. But despite these apparent "weaknesses," the Security Council resolution worked. Less than two weeks following the unanimous vote, North Korea agreed to return to the six-party talks.
This time, they were ready to deal. Negotiations began in earnest in December 2006. Two months later, on February 13, 2007, the United States announced the first major breakthrough in the stand-off since the Agreed Framework was nullified. The North agreed to shut its facility in Yongbyon and invite IAEA inspectors back to the country. Further, North Korea agreed to a process that would let inspectors investigate other suspected nuclear sites. In return, the United States began a process to normalize relations with North Korea, which included the release of $25 million in frozen assets.
The turning point of the long running nuclear saga was clear. The North provoked the Security Council into action with October's nuclear test. The Security Council met that challenge, and speaking with a unified voice presented North Korea with the prospect of international isolation the likes of which it had not yet experienced. True, the sanctions were not as tough as could be. But in this case, they were precisely tough-enough to force the North back to the six party talks.
Pressuring Tehran
In Iran, a similar dynamic is taking shape. In less than four months, the government of Iran has faced two Security Council sanctions resolutions. It is becoming increasingly clear that these resolutions are forcing Iran to made hard choices about its nuclear ambitions. The government is being asked to decide between their nuclear program and suffering global isolation that that has only grown deeper since the sanctions went into effect.
Iran's current dilemma stems from revelations in 2002 that Iran had developed two secret uranium enrichment facilities. Following this disclosure, the so-called EU-3 (The United Kingdom, France, and Germany) lead international diplomatic efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement by offering a package of economic incentives in exchange for the verifiable suspension of the Iranian nuclear program. (The United States does not have diplomatic relations with Tehran and has leveled unilateral sanctions against Iran since 1979). After years of back and forth, Iran remained defiant. Finally, in February 2006, the International Atomic Energy Agency referred the situation to the Security Council.
In July 2006 the Security Council approved Resolution 1696, which gave Iran one month to suspend its uranium enrichment and reprocessing programs. The deadline passed without compliance. Iran, it seemed, was determined to continue uranium enrichment and related nuclear activities. In the fall of 2006 the Security Council met frequently to discuss ways to punish Iran for defying Resolution 1696. Then on December 23, after months of difficult negotiations, the Council approved Resolution 1737, which imposed punitive economic sanctions on Iran. The resolution prohibited the transfer of materials or technology to support Iran's nuclear program and froze the assets of a number of Iranian officials connected to the program. It also gave Iran 60 days to comply with Resolution 1696 or else suffer a tougher set of sanctions. When Iran did not comply, the Council authorized a second set of punitive sanctions in late March.
At time of publication, the sanctions had begun to insert a new dimension into domestic politics in Iran. Speaking to reporters following unanimous Security Council vote on the second set of sanctions, Nicholas Burns, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs warned, "If Iran has Qatar, a gulf Arab state, and Indonesia, a Muslim state, and South Africa, a leading member of the nonaligned movement, voting for these sanctions, Iran is in trouble internationally." Indeed, since these sanctions resolutions were enacted, a number of Iran analysts have identified a marked change of behavior in Tehran. Writing in the New York Times in February, The Hoover Institution's Abbas Milani explains, "Top leaders of the Islamic Republic…have made it clear that they consider sanctions a serious threat…what the unilateral and increasingly quixotic American embargo could not do in more than a decade, a limited United Nations resolution has accomplished in less than a month. And the resolution succeeded because few things frighten the mullahs more than the prospect of confronting a united front made up of the European Union, Russia, China, and the United States."
There are other signs that Iranian hard liners are loosing influence to more pragmatic elements in Iran who are willing to cut a deal. Newsweek reported in mid march that Ayatollah Khamenei blasted President Ahmandinejad for dismissing the sanctions as a "piece of torn paper." The article also reported that an Iranian parliamentary committee advised that everything "must be done" to head off further sanctions. Further, the Ayatollah's chief foreign policy advisor and de facto spokesman has declared that suspending uranium enrichment is not a red line for the regime and that "everything is negotiable." Finally, at time of publication, Iran had delayed the recall of its UN Ambassador, a well-known moderate who favors a negotiated settlement to further confrontation with the west. To be sure, Iran has yet to formally eschew its uranium enrichment and related activities, but the united global front is clearly forcing a new debate in Tehran.
Time for renewal
No one should be sanguine about the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea. Still, events over the past six months have shown that Security Council action can help change the behavior would-be proliferators. The council's strength lies in its unique power to collectively condemn obstreperous governments. And this cooperative approach to the dilemmas posed by North Korea and Iran has shown that counter-proliferation strategies that seek expansive international cooperation can, and do, work. But rather than simply respond as threats happen to appear, the international community ought to proactively bolster existing non-proliferation systems.
Unfortunately, decades of neglect has sped the erosion of international non-proliferation regimes. Key provisions of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) are routinely applied in an ad hoc manner. Disarmament, which in addition to non-proliferation and civilian use of nuclear power composes a key pillar to the NPT, is far from a priority among many nuclear weapons states. Indeed, many key states are actively expanding their nuclear arsenals through developing so-called "tactical" nuclear weapons systems. Without a firm commitment to disarmament, the rest of the NPT — particularly prohibitions on weapons transfers — is structurally weakened.
Other degradations of longstanding international non-proliferation norms have also undermined global efforts to reduce the nuclear threat. The American unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty in 2002 dealt a serious and symbolic blow to international arms control law. Similarly, bilateral arrangements that allow civilian nuclear technology transfer to non-signatories of the NPT further undermines the value of the NPT.
International arms control forums are also stalled. The 2005 NPT Review Conference (which is convened every five years by signatories) ended without making progress on how to further strengthen the accord. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is also floundering. Though signed by 177 states since it was authored in 1996, the CTBT has yet to be ratified by a critical number of states.
Recommendations:
It is time to reverse course. The breakthrough in North Korea and concerted international effort to wean Iran from developing an indigenous uranium enrichment program has shown that international cooperation on non-proliferation is not a lost cause. Just the opposite is the case: instruments for managing nuclear proliferation need to be renewed and strengthened. To that end, there are a number of promising developments and new opportunities that can be seized upon that could do much to counter the spread of nuclear weapons.
- The 2005 world summit outcome document, signed by virtually every head of state, detailed a number of important reforms for the world body. However, on proliferation issues, the document was shamefully silent. This occurred, in part, because certain key nuclear states would not back language on disarmament. In turn, nuclear states not party to the NPT banded together to block non-proliferation goals from entering the text.
This was a great disservice to the cause of arms control. Before it was stricken from the final draft of the outcome document, the section on non-proliferation and disarmament provided a useful blueprint for a long term strategy to reduce the nuclear threat. This included firm commitments to both nuclear arms reduction and a reaffirmation of non-proliferation instruments, including the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention. Member states should revisit this blue-print in light of the failed 2005 summit and avoid zero-sum tactics when negotiating this issue.
- The setbacks at the 2005 world summit, the NPT Review conference, and other international forums occurred, in part, because a small number of states could not make the mutual concessions necessary to move the debate forward. To help counter this disturbing trend, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has sought to incorporate the UN's disarmament portfolio into the office of the Secretary General. Citing the need to "revitalize the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda through a more focused effort," Ban proposed that the Department of Disarmament Affairs be augmented with a new Office of Disarmament Affairs that answers directly to the Secretary General. In March, the General Assembly approved this move and created a new High Representative for Disarmament Affairs to act as the voice of the Secretary General in disarmament and nonproliferation debates.
This a welcome move that signals the importance that Ban attaches to this issue. Member states should now do all they can to strengthen that office. With support, the High Representative can inject new life into these negotiations and help pry states away from entrenched positions.
- In September 2006, The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), founded by former senator Sam Nunn and Ted Turner, took a key first step toward creating a reserve stockpile of low-enriched uranium, to be administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency. As proposed by NTI, the bank would provide an insurance policy for countries that want to develop nuclear power, but lack domestic enrichment facilities and therefore must depend on importing enriched uranium. With a guaranteed source of low-enriched uranium, countries will feel less compelled to develop indigenous enrichment facilities, which in turn can be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. IAEA Chief Mohammed elBaradei has endorsed this proposal, which includes a grant of $50 million in seed money, pledged by NTI with the backing of investor Warren Buffet. There is, however, a limit to what philanthropies can accomplish on their own. For the fuel bank to work, it needs financial and political support by a government or governments. To that end, Congressman Tom Lantos, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, has introduced legislation that affirms this approach and provides another $50 million for the bank. Congress would be wise to act on this legislation. And other countries should follow suit with their own financial and political commitments to the bank.
A multilateral approach to combating proliferation is preferable not for its own sake, but because it has proven to be more effective. Security Council sanctions that punish proliferators can be an important and effectual tool to wield. But equally important are firm commitments to long term strategies to strengthen arms control and proliferation standards. That way, countries will be more restrained from seeking these weapons in the first place. And this should be a goal that, ultimately, every country can support. |
